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By now we all are familiar with the litany of cases which refused to find elevated
scrutiny for so-called “affirmative” or “social” rights such as education, welfare or
housing: Lindsey v. Normet,1 San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,2 Dandridge v.
Williams,3 DeShaney v. Winnebago County.4 There didn’t seem to be anything in
minimum scrutiny which could protect such facts as education or housing, from
government action. However, unobtrusively and over the years, the Supreme Court has
clarified and articulated one aspect of minimum scrutiny which holds promise for
vindicating facts. You will recall that under minimum scrutiny government’s action is
sustained if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. That has seemed
hopelessly vague. However, through a series of cases the Supreme Court has now made
it clear that the three prongs of the test—rationality, relationship and government—are
questions of fact for the trier of fact. This opens up the possibility that civil discovery
can show, with respect to criteria for these prongs, that government fails to meet
minimum scrutiny.
Actually, the tendency of the Court’s minimum scrutiny
jurisprudence is to severely disfavor discretion, and strongly favor factual showing, in
minimum scrutiny adjudication. The eminent domain decision, Kelo v. New London,5
surprised everyone by being a 5-4 decision, when most commentators felt the case would
amount to no more than a reaffirmation of discretion with respect to eminent domain, and
for that reason vindicate government by a large margin. Actually, Kelo is something like
a penultimate step of the Court in articulating its new jurisprudence of factual analysis
with respect to minimum scrutiny.
The important thing about Kelo, as we shall see, is that although it applies the new
criteria to eminent domain, the gravamen of the Court’s complaint is that government has
not been making factual showings under minimum scrutiny. That’s what the Court feels,
has gotten seriously out of hand. Minimum scrutiny is not a blank check or a free pass.
That means that it is not a blank check when minimum scrutiny is used to justify
government action with respect to taxation, housing, regulation, liberty, health care,
welfare, or anything else. In this new minimum scrutiny jurisprudence, for example,
educators may find themselves asking strange questions about a government’s action
with respect to education which they don’t like. For example, did government substitute
a private purpose for a government purpose in the education action? Housing advocates
may find themselves issuing subpoenas to find out whether, with respect to a government
housing policy, government lied? In connection with a health policy, did government
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conceal documents or transfer personnel? These are all questions the Supreme Court
now invites in litigating minimum scrutiny with regard to government action as it relates
to any fact. The prehistory of the new minimum scrutiny criteria, is briefly told because
there isn’t much to tell: until the Court decided to become more active, there were very
meager criteria. More detailed criteria have only appeared recently.
From Hawaii Housing Authority to Virginia
Until meaningful changes in eminent domain law give property owners a better
chance to fight eminent domain proceedings, the old minimum scrutiny for eminent
domain—reaffirmed in Kelo v. New London—remains. That standard allows eminent
domain use if the use is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. That
sounds as though virtually anything would qualify. Is there anything concrete in it which
would give property owners a way to fight back? There is. It is the phrase “government
purpose.”
Prior to Kelo, the Supreme Court had said, in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, that the government purpose need only be “conceivable”6—apparently
something the Court could conclude retrospectively. This raised the question, whether
there need in fact be a government purpose?
From Virginia to Kelo
The Court answered this, prior to Kelo, in Virginia v. United States. In Virginia,
the Court found that there must be a very high level of proof to justify gender
discrimination in public education. In discussing government purpose, the Court said that
the government purpose “must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in
response to litigation.”7 There must in factbe a government purpose , and it is concluded
prospectively, not retrospectively.
This was a very important clarification and it seems to have gone unnoticed. The
idea is not mentioned in the two cases the Court cites for the proposition.8
From Kelo to New Minimum Scrutiny Litigation
In his Kelo concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy articulated for the first time, the
detailed factual criteria for government purpose by laying out a whole program of civil
discovery for litigants to follow. In it, he synthesized, under the concept of “primary,”
the twin aspects of government purpose, factual and prospective. Private parties are
evaluated by the place they hold in the chronology, not the role they play in the
development. That is, the goal of discovery is establish the chronology, because the
distinction between public purpose and private purpose turns on the chronology. He
wrote: “A court confronted with a plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism to
private parties should [conduct]….a careful and extensive inquiry into “whether, in fact,
the development plan [chronology]
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[1.] is of primary benefit to . . . the developer…, and private businesses which may
eventually locate in the plan area…,
[2.] and in that regard, only of incidental benefit to the city….[,]”
and whether the chronology shows
“[3.] awareness of…depressed economic condition and evidence corroborating the
validity of this concern…,
[4.] the substantial commitment of public funds…before most of the private beneficiaries
were known…,
[5.] evidence that [government] reviewed a variety of development plans…[,]
[6.] [government] chose a private developer from a group of applicants rather than
picking out a particular transferee beforehand and…
[7.] other private beneficiaries of the project [were]…unknown [to government] because
the…space proposed to be built [had] not yet been rented….”
These are all prospective criteria; government purpose is shown ab initio, not post hoc.
And it is shown by facts. Nor is the “primary” test limited, with respect to discovery, as
to the earliest date of relevance. For example, “primary” with respect to “awareness,”
does not imply a particular starting date; government has the burden of showing what
facts make up its “awareness.” These are all criteria subject to depositions, document
subpoenas, and the usual orders and procedures of civil discovery. Kennedy added: “The
trial court concluded, based on these findings, that benefiting Pfizer [a drug company
interested in locating facilities on the land seized by eminent domain] was not ‘the
primary motivation or effect of [New London’s] development plan’; instead, ‘the primary
motivation for [New London] was to take advantage of Pfizer’s presence’….Likewise,
the trial court concluded that ‘[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate that…[New
London was] motivated by a desire to aid [other] particular private entities….9 Kennedy
makes it clear that government purpose is an issue of fact for the trier of fact.
Let’s generalize these concerns by looking at them in the context of a health care
policy. Does it show a government purpose? To answer that question, we need facts
which allow the Court to decide
whether, in fact, the health care purpose chronology
1. is of primary benefit to another purpose than health care,
2. and in that regard, only of incidental benefit to health care,
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and whether the chronology shows
3. awareness of deficiencies in health care and evidence corroborating the validity of this
concern,
4. a substantial government health care policy…before another purpose is known,
5. evidence that government reviewed a variety of health care policies,
6. government chose a policy from a range of choices rather than picking out a particular
policy beforehand and
7. other policy implications were unknown to government.
In short, the Court is saying that when government cannot show a health care purpose, it
fails to show a government purpose. Now let’s go back to eminent domain and see just
how sordid the story can become using discovery to try to meet the criteria. And
remember, this is the sort of trail any litigator may be obliged to follow in order to
vindicate a client against government’s invocation of minimum scrutiny.
From New Scrutiny Minimum Scrutiny Litigation to New Constitutional Rights
The factual distinction between public and private purpose is well known in
political science, as capture theory, in which private purpose with respect to certain facts,
is substituted for government purpose with respect to those facts. Purpose as fact, is not
at all the issue. What the Court wants to know is, whose purpose? And it wants a factual
showing on that issue.10 It is highly ironic, therefore, that in the true facts of Kelo—
which came out after the Court decided the case—it was learned that New London had
had a private purpose after all. The true chronology didn’t meet a single one of Justice
Kennedy’s criteria. New London had simply lied to the Court. New London had argued
the following chronology to the Supreme Court:
1. New London decided, based on a factual inquiry, that it wanted to revitalize;
2. New London announced its desire;
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3. Pfizer Corporation heard about it and approached New London with a plan.
4. New London accepted Pfizer’s plan.
That was not, in fact, what had happened:
In mid-July [2004, after the Supreme Court had decided to hear the Kelo case, which it decided in
June of 2005], as commentators and politicians around the country decried [New London’s]
attempt to seize private homes for economic development on the Fort Trumbull peninsula, a press
release appeared on the Web site of Pfizer Inc. The pharmaceutical company, whose $300
million research complex sits adjacent to what remains of the neighborhood, announced that it
wanted to set the record straight on its involvement in the Fort Trumbull development project.
The project, the statement said, wasn’t Pfizer’s idea. “We at Pfizer have been dismayed to see
false and misleading claims appear in the media that suggest Pfizer is somehow involved in this
matter,” the statement said. The writers said the company “has no requirements nor interest in the
development of the land that is the subject of the case.” But a recent, months-long review of state
records and correspondence from 1997 and 1998—when officials from the administration of
then-Gov. John G. Rowland were helping convince the pharmaceutical giant to build in New
London—shows that statement is misleading, at best. In fact, the company has been intimately
involved in the project since its inception, consulting with state and city officials about the plans
for the peninsula and helping to shape the vision of how the faded neighborhood might eventually
be transformed into a complex of high-end housing and office space, anchored by a luxury hotel.
The records—obtained by The Day through the state Freedom of Information Act—show that, at
least as early as the fall of 1997, Pfizer executives and state economic development officials were
discussing the company’s plans, not just for a new research facility but for the surrounding
neighborhood as well. And, after several requests, the state Department of Economic and
Community Development [DECD] produced a document that both the state and Pfizer had at first
said did not exist: a 1997 sketch, prepared by CUH2A, Pfizer’s design firm for its new facility.
Labeled as a “vision statement,” it suggested various ways the existing neighborhood and nearby
vacant Navy facility could be replaced with a “high end residential district,” offices and retail
businesses, expanded parking and a marina. Those interactions took place months before Pfizer
announced that it would build in the city, on the site of the former New London Mills linoleum
factory, and months before the New London Development Corp. announced its redevelopment
plans for the neighborhood and the former Naval Undersea Warfare Center next door. The
NLDC’s plans, while different in many respects from the hand-drawn 1997 plan, maintain the
vision statement’s core purpose—a total replacement of the existing stock of modest homes,
apartment houses and businesses, and the development of upscale housing and office space to jibe
with the new Pfizer complex. NLDC and city officials have long characterized their efforts to
recast the working-class neighborhood as a response to Pfizer’s decision to build on the
peninsula, rather than a move made as a condition of Pfizer’s involvement in the project. And in
the state and federal court rulings that upheld the city’s takings of homes for the private
development project, judges at every level of the judiciary have assumed the same. Even in a
blistering dissent, which warned that the NLDC’s plan left all private property under the “specter
of condemnation,” U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor sets the beginning of the
case in February 1998, when Pfizer announced its plans to build its facility. While challenging
the constitutionality of the eminent domain project, O’Connor and the other justices accept that it
was an independent effort to “complement” the construction of a research complex next door.
But in a series of recent interviews, several former high-ranking state officials confirmed what
opponents of the project have long insisted and what the company continues to deny: the state’s
agreement to replace the existing neighborhood was a condition of Pfizer’s move here….Any
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attempt to clarify the origins of the development project is hindered both by the passage of time
and by the fact that many of the participants in the earliest discussions with the company will not,
or cannot talk about their efforts. Peter N. Ellef, who as DECD commissioner and later [former
Governor] Rowland’s co-chief of staff oversaw the state’s involvement, is awaiting trial on
federal corruption charges stemming from his years in the governor’s office….Rowland, who
publicly embraced this and other urban development projects and poured in state bond funds, sits
in federal prison in Pennsylvania after pleading guilty to a corruption charge….But some former
members of the Rowland administration with knowledge of the state’s negotiations with Pfizer,
speaking on the condition of anonymity because they wished to spare their relationships with
current and former colleagues, confirmed Pfizer’s involvement in the planning of the Fort
Trumbull project. The company’s formal assistance agreements with the state, which lay out
more than $118 million in financial incentives and other amenities that were offered by the state
and the city to convince Pfizer to build in New London, does not specifically offer to redevelop
the neighborhood. But the redevelopment project, largely paid for with an additional $73 million
in bonded funds, was an integral part of the state’s deal with Pfizer, the officials said, and the
company would not have built its headquarters in New London without being assured that the
surroundings would undergo a radical change. “They would not have done the deal without the
commitment to make the surrounding area more livable,” said a high-ranking official who was
privy to negotiations between Pfizer and the state. “They were trying to attract people with
Ph.D.s who make $150,000 to $200,000 a year to eastern Connecticut…and they were not going
to tell them they had to drive to work through a blighted community….I’m not going to tell you it
was a difficult decision,” the official said. “It wasn’t, because of the number of jobs….”But for
years, executives at Pfizer, along with the state and the NLDC, have disputed that view. Instead,
they have maintained that the effort to redevelop the neighborhood came only in response to
Pfizer’s announcement that it would locate its headquarters here, and they have insisted that the
company never directed the state or city to overhaul the surrounding area in exchange for that
construction….In interviews, however, the state officials made clear that the difference between a
demand by Pfizer and a statement of preference about what it would like to see next door was a
small one, especially when the city and state had already committed to invest, according to
figures from the DECD, a total of $118 million in other incentives. “This wasn’t like convincing
a bank in Norwalk to move to Stamford,” a former NLDC employee said. “This was a major
league deal. This was 2,000 jobs, et cetera. They know what that means. DECD knows what
that means….What do we need to make this happen?”….In retrospect, the company’s interest in
the Fort Trumbull project does not seem to have been much of a secret at the state level, where
the project seems largely to have been treated as part of the package of incentives prepared for
Pfizer. For instance, on Dec. 11, 1997, DECD Commissioner James F. Abromaitis wrote…[that
the state would help] by “defraying the cost of that development and improving its value through
a comprehensive, state-funded waterfront improvement and development project,” seemingly a
reference to the Fort Trumbull neighborhood….In the meantime, the NLDC and the city—not the
state, and not Pfizer—have absorbed the sharpest criticism since the Supreme Court decision
brought the New London case to the public eye. And that, one of the state officials said, was no
accident. “They have taken all the missile attacks,” the official said, referring to the development
corporation. “That’s the beauty of distance.”11

Thus, the true chronology was
1. New London wanted Pfizer to locate in New London;
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2. Pfizer approached New London with its plan;
3. New London adopted the plan;
4. New London announced its redevelopment plan.
What is missing in the second chronology? What is missing is the government purpose.
There is only Pfizer’s purpose. Private purpose has been substituted for government
purpose, and so the development plan fails (should have failed) minimum scrutiny.
Now that the scam has been revealed in the famous Kelo case, litigants are turning
to the government purpose prong of minimum scrutiny, in order to save their property.
One lawsuit in New Jersey directly invokes Justice Kennedy’s criteria: “In his Kelo
concurrence, Justice Kennedy commented that the evidence showed that New London,
‘reviewed a variety of development plans and chose a private developer from a group of
applicants rather than picking out a particular transferee beforehand.’ Plaintiffs contend
that did not happen here. Long Branch [New Jersey city government] promised the area
to the [private development business] principals before the [private development
business] was even created, and then everything—the designation of the area in need of
redevelopment, the creation of [the private development business], the designation of [the
private development business] as the developer, the passing of the Ordinance authorizing
eminent domain—all were implemented to seal the deal.” Indeed, this action reaches
back into the actions of the principals, pointing out their acquisition of properties and
running them down purposely, in order to provide the government finding of “blight”
which was legally necessary to proclaim a plan for redevelopment and the invoking of the
eminent domain power.12
The Emerging Realignment of Prongs of the Minimum Scrutiny Text
The Kelo Court accepted that private purpose can play a role in eminent domain
use, finding that “[t]here is, moreover, no principled way of distinguishing economic
development from the other public purposes that we have recognized.”13 However, that
camouflaged the proper distinction to be made, between government and private purpose,
for which there is a principled way to distinguish. The true facts in Kelo also shed light
on another criteria which Justice Kennedy did not mention: deception. Does government
lie about the chronology? If it did, that undermines its credibility when it comes to all the
other criteria, since all the other establish chronology.
Finally, lying about the chronology undermines another prong of minimum
scrutiny which government might claim it meets in its attempt to use eminent domain:
rational. There is nothing rational about the lie. This, in turn, sheds light on the third
prong: relates. That is also a question of fact for the trier of fact. What government does
is not assumed to be rational: that is something government must prove. “Relates” means
interrelates. Government must show that its chronology is internally consistent. New
London understood the legal test for government purpose perfectly well. It understood
perfectly well that each prong of minimum scrutiny—rational, relate, government—is a
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question of fact for the trier of fact. It knew it had to conceal what it had done, or the
Court would not have allowed it to use eminent domain. Discovery may also reveal that
the developers also understand that the government purpose test is a factual test, and that
they need to help government to show that there was no substitution of private purpose
for public purpose. This raises the possibility of civil conspiracy charges as well as
lawsuits brought under the Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). So
documents are shredded, people are transferred, memories fail. In these cases, revealing
the chronology is exactly what must be done to stop eminent domain uses if there is no
law which will stop them, and given the idiotically vague ‘reforms’ which have been
proposed, litigation will more and more turn on establishing the facts with respect to the
government purpose test. Chronology will turn out to be hugely important in these
cases. If the true chronology in New London had been known—instead of the lying
chronology presented by New London—Susette Kelo would have won her case. Enough
said. More importantly, none of these new criteria and alignments, are specific to
eminent domain. Rather, they reflect the Court’s increasing concern that government
increasingly tries to push facts out of government. This means that the Court is
increasingly receptive to all facts which seek to integrate themselves into minimum
scrutiny. This is about-face from the days when the Court said it was not interested in
elevating facts above minimum scrutiny. It is an invitation for litigants to obtain what
they want, with respect to those facts, simply by using civil discovery in connection with
minimum scrutiny. Because it is there to be used.
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